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Introduction 
Studies over the years have argued for and demonstrated both the ethical imperatives 
for gendered, racial and ethnic diversity within youth educational and civic spaces as 
well as the instrumental benefits of increased diversity for the civic engagement and 
learning of all participants (Gurin, Dey, Gurin, & Hurtado, 2003). In light of the 
largely white, generally middle-class and hierarchically male constitution of many 
youth civic organisations in the UK, other research has shown how young people 
from ethnic minorities could be said to belong to a range of ‘civic subcultures’ 
possessing distinct modes of and dispositions towards engagement (Sanchez-
Jankowski, 2002). Bringing these subcultures into the mainstream of youth civic and 
political participation has not been straightforward, even with the advent of the 
internet and smartphones (Banaji & Buckingham, 2013). Paying attention to this 
difficulty and this goal, a common rhetoric, in many youth-focused or youth-led civic 
and political action groups in the UK, centres on the importance of promoting 
equality and diversity in politics in order to empower the participation of marginalised 
young people and their communities. Reaching such groups is an explicit and oft-
stated aim.1 In this context, inclusivity and diversity are framed as transparent 
concepts, and as an unquestioned good in practical terms. Yet there is often little 
thought given to how these rhetorical aspirations are either put into practice or are 
generative of outcomes in line with the broader goals of initiatives that characterise 
themselves as being concerned with diversity while also being accountable in ways 
that meet the frameworks of neoliberal socio-political reform. In searching for insight 
into how equality, diversity and inclusivity policies and practices are enacted within 
youth civic and political groups and organisations, this chapter draws on a year-long 
ethnography to explore the dynamics of diversity in two prominent youth-led political 
participation campaigns preceding, during, and after the 2017 UK general election. 
We specifically examine the rhetorical commitments to diversity expressed by 
organisational and campaign group actors in interviews and in public-facing 
communication strategies (events, digital media, texts) to make sense of how such 
rhetorics reflect or contest neoliberal notions of diversity, and in turn shape practices 
of inclusivity and diversity. 
 
Conceptualising diversity in a marketised world 
In the contemporary social moment, the buzzword ‘diversity,’ as a way of thinking 
about how the UK and other Western countries should structure social life, would 
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appear to be fairly uniformly accepted by organisation leaders – in the UK at least one 
would struggle to find a youth leader, a CEO, a politician or a celebrity other than 
those with affiliations to the far right who would come out explicitly against diversity 
as a stated goal. But the word itself and the normative meanings it inscribes can be 
vague in both conceptualisation and application despite the wide acceptance and use 
of the term. Indeed, ‘diversity,’ performs a number of quite specific discursive and 
material functions that principally derive from a long history of struggles for equality 
and social justice across many institutional and political venues in the UK and 
elsewhere (particularly the United States and Canada). In this chapter, we consider the 
concept of diversity as comprising rhetorical articulations, institutional/structural 
policies, and symbolic and material practices aimed at encouraging less homogeneity 
in the demographic makeup of political, social and cultural institutions, and ultimately 
meant to redress historical legacies of global structural inequality. In the context of 
race, this homogeneity reflects a global history of geopolitical colonialism and 
imperialism by European and North American nations largely controlled by white 
(Caucasian) heterosexual males. Since W.E.B. Du Bois (2007 [1903]) first 
articulation of the metaphor of ‘the veil’ as a barrier between African Americans’ 
realities and the vast privileges and power afforded to white Americans, the various 
forms of symbolic and material domination by Europeans (and Euro-descendants) of 
non-white ‘others’ throughout history from colonialism to contemporary society has 
been cogently theorised by scholars from both the Global North and Global South 
(Bonilla-Silva, 1997; Fanon, 1963; Hall, 1997; Said, 1995; Spivak, 1988).  
‘Diversity’ discourse is therefore predicated on  European colonialism and subsequent 
geopolitical domination and political racism. These phenomena set up the conditions 
for a unidirectional social construction of difference, where ‘groups holding political 
and economic power construct racial categories to privilege members of their groups 
and marginalize outside groups’ (Banks, 2005, p. 98). Historically entrenched patters 
of homogeneity emerge in virtually every sphere of public and institutional life and all 
privilege whiteness (da Silva, 2007; Delgado & Stefancic, 1997; Feagin, 2013; 
Leonardo, 2002) and its intersection with maleness, heterosexuality and social class. 
It has been argued that the endurance of white domination and privilege in societies 
constitute and reproduce ‘white racial frames’ that ‘assertively accents a positive view 
of white superiority, virtue, moral goodness, and action…[but features] a strong 
negative orientation to racial “others” who are exploited and oppressed’(Feagin, 2013, 
p. 10). For da Silva (2007), this racial frame is global because race is a necessary 
condition of and for modern globalised societies with the histories discussed. Indeed, 
while race is just one category for the construction of difference as it relates to current 
understandings of the purposes of ‘diversity’ for organisations, groups and 
movements – gender, disability, sexuality, class and age are vital and explicitly named 
aspects of most diversity agendas – it is the notion of difference in appearance, 
mainly via skin colour, that is typically understood in British organisations as 
constituting diversity (Ahmed, 2009). Therefore, although some organisations have 
gone down the path of assuming that the appointment of white women makes an 
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organisation, body or committee ‘diverse’, the aforementioned race-based 
conceptualisation of diversity is the primary focus of this study. 
 
“Diversity” as neoliberal 
In recent decades, the UK and other nations have begun to address various forms of 
institutional homogeneity. Approaches to public policy, organisational management, 
and civic engagement have evolved in order to redress perceived representational 
imbalances (Stewart & Lindburg, 1997; Wise & Tschirhart, 2000) What began from 
social movements against racism and in favour of affirmative action as primarily a 
moral and ethical imperative to respond to the lack of representation and opportunities 
available to certain groups (and/or equally as likely, a legal requirement placed by 
governments on institutions in response to events or political struggles) has gradually 
become a marketised set of practices (Bowl, 2018; Kelly & Dobbin, 1998) with 
outcomes that can be detrimental to the mission of anti-racism and the core goals of 
promoting equality and social justice as a response to systemic and institutional biases 
(Ahmed, 2012).  
As the idea of ‘managing’ diversity as a field replete with missions, resources and 
administrative logics has evolved, so too have understandings and practices regarding 
how to combine moral, strategic, and increasingly, neoliberal imperatives in order to 
produce outcomes ostensibly aimed at ‘increasing’ or ‘improving’ diverse 
representation in organisations. Ahmed (2009) sees these competing discourses as 
being mainly about economic and moral value, pitting the ‘business case’ against the 
‘social justice case’ for diversity, and contends that such a discursive logic ‘reifies 
difference as something that already exists “in” the bodies of others’ (p. 43), which 
enables a quantification and commodification of difference. Others have theorised UK 
government diversity policies as fully marketised ‘products’. For example, through an 
examination of how British government film policies on diversity exclude the input of 
certain socio-economic groups in their representation, Nwonka (2015) suggests that 
diversity policy became the primary multicultural product ‘sold’ by 1990s New 
Labour in order to advance political goals of multiculturalism and social cohesion. 
Other scholars point out that the language of UK government policy over the past four 
decades has effectively neoliberalised frameworks of ‘participation,’ ‘empowerment,’ 
and ‘responsibility’ entwining them with notions of and policies for ‘community 
cohesion’ (MacLeavy, 2008). This shifts responsibility for addressing problems of 
social unrest about inequality onto local communities comprised mainly of ethnic 
minorities – who are themselves ostensibly meant to be assisted by such policies 
(Ibid).  
One particularly salient indicator of neoliberal subjectivity is the notion of brand 
management or enhancement, a cultural process that focuses on the performance of 
visibility to signify substance, and the performance of substance (‘values’) to generate 
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profit (Banet-Weiser, 2012). Ahmed (2009) argues that the results of diversity – new, 
‘diverse’ faces in the institution that offer ‘evidence of commitment, of change, of 
progress’ (p. 41) – offer a narrative of success that organisations use to point to how 
they have ‘solved’ the problem, enabling them to end the conversation before 
undertaking any meaningful examination of the (economic, social and political) layers 
of discrimination. Little happens beyond having ‘different looking people’ at the 
office or in the room. An aura of diversity, through its implications of positive, 
progressive and morally commendable change, can also make institutions, localities 
and groups more ‘marketable’ or ‘cool’, while simultaneously masking racism, 
classism and other inequalities through a focus on ‘looking and feeling good’ and an 
obscuring of ‘the rotten core behind a shiny surface’ (Ahmed, 2009, p. 44). In this 
view, diversity work is fundamentally about managing perceptions instead of being 
about working for justice-oriented systemic change. Such a view lends further support 
to arguments that neoliberalism compromises human rights struggles, as we are 
‘condemned to watch but powerless to deter’ (Moyn, 2014, p. 151) its effects on 
societies.  
 
“Diversity” as disempowering, obscuring, and redirecting struggles for 
structural justice 
As the terminology of ‘diversity’ has taken on neoliberal characteristics across 
Western institutions via its insertion into neoliberal practices and discourses, the use 
of this phrase has also been enacted in ways that can stifle difficult questions about 
the long-term impact and implications of a diversity agenda which has cut itself loose 
from critical feminism, anti-racism and equity. Scholars have argued that the 
application of neoliberal imperatives to ‘construct docile ways of talking about 
diversity is a way of preserving the cultural order’ (Matus & Infante, 2011, p. 305). 
Sara Ahmed (2007) argues persuasively that the discourse of diversity in professional 
institutions can become decoupled from the original purposes of social justice and 
equality that have driven movements for enhancing inclusivity and diversity in the 
workplace and other social and political institutions. In other words, neoliberal values 
imbue discourse about diversity with new dimensions of understanding that devalue 
the aims of diversity actions. The malleability of the concept of diversity – shorn of 
the contexts of struggle in which it emerged – can be most problematic. What counts 
as diversity is then shaped by those in positions of power, more likely than not 
individuals with economic and social capital, largely white, and this openness to co-
option may in fact allow for the defining diversity in ‘ways that reproduce rather than 
challenge social privilege’ (Ahmed, 2007, p. 240).  
Examining public service broadcasting in the UK, Malik (2013) argues that an 
‘incremental depoliticisation of race’ has changed the nature of diversity initiatives 
and policies from a focus on multiculturalism, to one on cultural diversity, and finally 
to one on creative diversity, a phrase and conceptualisation characterised by 
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classlessness and ‘racelessness’ due to its ‘lack of engagement with inequalities and 
racisms’ (Malik, 2013, p. 239). Ahmed (2009) cautions that the manner in which 
organisations construct diversity discursively as an end in itself – as if the presence 
and actions of diversity initiatives and policies represents a transparent, ahistorical 
and  adequate solution – can undermine efforts to confront racism: 
For Black staff in the diversity world, the recognition of the ongoing nature of 
racism is constantly blocked. Organisations wanted to talk about diversity 
rather than racism. Diversity becomes a technology for not hearing. (Ahmed, 
2009, p. 47) 
Diversity, while regarded as both an aspirational and moral end that satisfies 
neoliberal managerial imperatives as well as responds to government-mandated 
initiatives, nonetheless can obscure the broader purposes of such schemes to 
recognise and combat institutional racism and other forms of structural violence 
against historically marginalised groups. In doing so, diversity as discourse supplants 
and obscures more transformative or revolutionary discourses of structural change 
and systemic justice. When unreflexively applied in any organisational context from 
the most well known global corporations to social movements and educational 
institutions, the notion of diversity can be a lever for opening up conversations about 
discrimination, but can also come to act as a discourse to create ‘comforting’ spaces 
where questions of equality and equity are actually pushed aside (Matus & Infante, 
2011). Ahmed’s call to ’refuse the injunction to be happy objects for the organisation, 
which means being willing to cause trouble‘ (Ahmed, 2009, p. 41) suggests a radical 
course of action for diversity practitioners in organisations and other institutions and 
equally an uncomfortable one for those radical anti-racist and feminist young people 
operating inside the already hard-pressed youth civic sphere. Under this view, in order 
to achieve any progress in promoting social justice and equality, diversity-in-practice 
must involve a critical restructuring, and must unsettle existing demographic 
paradigms beyond recruiting for difference. With this vision in mind it is useful to 
recognise the reality of structural inertia in the contexts in which diversity initiatives 
are situated: 
Most [diversity] practitioners are appointed by organisations to transform 
them. But being appointed by an institution to transform it does not mean that 
the institution is willing to be transformed. (Ahmed, 2018)  
 
The promise and problems of youth diversity in UK active citizenship 
Although there are reasons to question whether there is or ever was just one version of 
what constitutes public good (Banaji, 2008), civic engagement ostensibly offers 
opportunities for young people to work collectively for the public good (Checkoway, 
2009). It is therefore an area of particular importance when looking to understand 
how struggles for equality and social justice are negotiated through collective civic 
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initiatives, movements and organisations. Set against the backdrop of on-going 
struggles to make British institutions more diverse, the youth voluntary and civic 
sector in the UK, like many other sectors of public life, has started to represent itself 
as being inclusive in its encouragement of participation and engagement. From 
websites that foreground young people wearing rainbow symbols and dreadlocks to 
policy documents on inclusion and diversity, evidence of this rhetorical change exists. 
Yet experiences of discrimination based on age, gender, race, ethnicity and other 
protected characteristics are still rife, and structural barriers to achieving meaningful 
equality of participation and opportunity also persist. Young middle- and higher-
income citizens are disproportionately likely to have more political influence 
(Levinson, 2010), while the promise of the Internet to democratise and expand 
participation for young people remains contingent on social differences in race, class, 
and age (Banaji & Buckingham, 2013). Our previous research has also demonstrated 
the ways in which public policy and news discourses in the UK consistently devalue 
and marginalise active youth citizenship (Mejias & Banaji, 2018). Hampton’s (2010) 
research shows that even in settings where the ostensible aim is to create equality of 
opportunity for young people from different backgrounds, existing inequalities are 
reproduced by covert, structural and unconscious racist biases within civic 
organisations. Alongside economic and discursive power, this chapter follows 
Hampton (2010) in recognising the importance of social capital in challenging or 
reproducing social inequality, and in applying these concepts to the study of race and 
diversity. 
In an ethnographic study of a voluntary youth association that focused on race and the 
development of social capital, Hampton and Duncan (2011) found that white youth 
were more likely than their black peers to exhibit racial homophily, and that 
institutional actors played a significant role in solidifying or bridging racial barriers. 
Their study found that trust was a critical factor in influencing the formation and 
collaborative potential of network members, which in turn helped to develop social 
capital. They argue that:  
Emphasising racial identity and the institutional context of a voluntary 
association highlights the importance of trust. Social relationships are shaped 
by power, social inequality, and the informal dynamics of trust, and social 
capital is linked to the opportunity structures that tie people to resources 
through a network of embedded social relationships. (Hampton & Duncan, 
2011, p. 478) 
Their study also illustrates how young white people were more likely to affiliate with 
other whites, while black and brown young people were more likely to form links 
both within and across races, a pattern of racial homophily where ‘whites were less 
likely to pursue bridging relationships with peers that transcended race, gender, and 
educational boundaries’ (Hampton & Duncan, 2011, p. 487). This finding about white 
homophily poses challenges for broadening diversity in majority white networks and 
settings. 
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Another significant challenge is to recognise the contested nature of citizenship and 
civic experiences specifically for young people, who are often not yet considered 
‘full’ citizens, which shapes different understandings of citizenship that can either be 
inclusive or exclusive of young people (Smith, Lister, Middleton, & Cox, 2005). In 
this sense the notion of diversity as applied to a youth active citizenship context takes 
on an additional meaning reflecting conscious work towards mitigating age and racial 
inequalities. 
Enabling more meaningful engagement for young people with the subject of diversity 
requires consistent opportunities and attention. For example, in a study of youth 
dialogues in Detroit, Checkoway (2009) showed that when exposed to specific 
opportunities for civic engagement around racial and ethnic identity, young people 
from diverse backgrounds were actively engaged. When youth civic and political 
organisations offer explicit opportunities in good faith to consider and act upon 
questions of diversity and community cohesion, young people come forward to take 
up these opportunities.  
Recognising both the contingent nature of diversity work, and the ways in which 
existing social inequalities challenge the potential for youth civic participation 
practices that advance equality, the remainder of this chapter explores how two youth 
political movements articulate and perform diversity as a part of their work. The aim 
of this chapter is to better understand how diversity in such contexts either reaffirms 
or transcends problematic discursive constructions – where the enactment of diversity 
becomes the solution to the problem – in favour of the more difficult pursuit of 
disrupting institutional life to confront structural injustice. In the cases that follow, we 
examine how two grassroots movements with similar political goals but widely 
differing approaches construct diversity discourse and work. 
 
My Life My Say and Momentum: A portrait of youth-led politics in the Brexit era 
In an ironic turn considering the nature of our investigations into young people’s 
active European citizenship, our ethnography was both fortuitously timed and deeply 
enriched as a result of the endorsement of the UK’s exit from the European Union by 
51 percent of the referendum voting populace in June 2016. The Brexit vote and its 
aftermath appeared to spark a surge in youth political interest in the country, as the 
following year saw a visible increase in youth group organising, campaigns, 
grassroots actions and mainstream political engagement (Sloam & Henn, 2018). By 
notable majorities, young people expressed dissatisfaction and dismay at the direction 
of the country and the future that Brexit would bring (Mejias & Banaji, 2017). 
 
Our two selected cases were particularly well suited to exploring the role and place of 
diversity in their respective activities. Led by a charismatic young local politician 
from East London of Turkish descent, My Life My Say (MLMS) is a grassroots youth 
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political participation charity aimed at providing meaningful opportunities for young 
people to learn about and engage in British politics. Their main activities involve 
organising café-style political discussion events for young people called Democracy 
Cafés, and standalone youth campaign public talks or panels, often featuring 
prominent national and European political figures and held in Parliament or European 
Union institutions in London (e.g. European Commission).  
In contrast, the second case study, Momentum, is a grassroots campaign group that 
emerged from a particular demographic of left-wing, socialist grassroots activists 
traditionally aligned with the Labour party. When the group first began their work in 
late 2015, Momentum boasted a political hybridity unique in contemporary British 
politics, largely attributable to the uniqueness of their leader, Jeremy Corbyn, a (so-
called ‘radical,’ far left) socialist voice leading a mainstream party. Although 
Momentum is not an organisation per se, they were highly organised in the service of 
supporting Corbyn and therefore the Labour party.  As such their approach to 
diversity reflected in many respects the Labour party approach, which involved the 
creation of specific diversity initiatives and accompanying personnel, and recognising 
diversity as a plank in a wider political platform. It is particularly important to note 
the context here, as Momentum, unlike the Labour party, operated on miniscule 
budgets and often had more volunteers than paid staff working there at any given 
time. 
We began working with MLMS and Momentum in early 2017, before Prime Minister 
Theresa May made the unexpected decision to call a snap general election, which 
sparked a tidal wave of campaign activity in both groups. Once the election had been 
called, we followed both groups for the duration of the 2017 general election 
campaign to understand what role ‘diversity’ played in generating support for their 
preferred general election candidate and party (for both, Corbyn and Labour). 
 
Methods 
During our year-long ethnography of MLMS and Momentum in 2017, our team was 
particularly interested in how diversity fit into the vision, policies and practices of 
both groups. In interviews with key informants, we asked direct questions about their 
views on diversity within their respective groups/organisations. We also used field 
notes to document when ‘diversity talk’ and ‘diversity work’ were absent or present 
during ethnographic observations, and what forms such talk and work took. In 
interviews and informal conversations, we were mindful of how context-contingent 
many of the answers to our questions might be. As researchers present during what 
became the busiest and most successful period of both MLMS and Momentum’s 
existence, we knew that it could be difficult to probe the quality of engagement with 
anti-racism and commitments to a diverse membership during a campaign in which 
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most people were overworked, unpaid, and focused on the wider goal of winning an 
election. 
In addition to interviews and observations, we analysed each group’s digital media 
communications on Twitter and Facebook. Analysis of public communication 
repertoires on social media (the most prominent public platform for both groups) 
offers an opportunity to examine the organisation’s enactment of diversity across 
multiple levels: first through a surface-level analysis of the appearance of diversity 
(highlighting what type of people are most likely to appear); secondly, by illuminating 
the logics of visual representation (in what contexts is diversity visually 
represented?); and thirdly by investigating when and how diversity work (i.e. 
initiatives, projects, policies or programmes) is communicated publicly. 
Our analysis involved triangulating interviews and observations with public-facing 
communications in order to more broadly elaborate how diversity work ‘works’ for 
each group during a time of considerable activity and heightened visibility due to the 
2017 UK general election campaign. In the following sections, we explore how each 
group conceptualised and enacted diversity as part of their youth active citizenship 
projects, to better understand the place of a diversity agenda in these two youth-led 
civic engagement groups. 
 
Conceptualising and enacting diversity work 
This section draws on interviews, observations, and public-facing communications of 
both cases to explore how diversity was conceived within each and across both. 
During our work with MLMS it became immediately clear that one of the dominant 
frames guiding the organisation’s rhetoric and actions was a commitment to the 
promotion of diverse age groups and that bringing more young people into the 
national political conversation was a recognised form of diversity work that relied on 
the same rhetorics of equality and inclusivity as the discussions around race. 
Similarly, workers and volunteers at Momentum often framed their cross-generational 
membership as a positive aspect of their movement. We therefore include in our 
analysis perceptions of youth as the face of diversity to consider how young people 
themselves are framed as actors who contribute to diversifying the civic and political 
arena.  
 
My Life My Say: Diversity as foundational, explicit, networked – and neoliberal 
MLMS is in many respects a one-man show, founded and run by a young and 
ambitious London politician with a compelling story of youth active citizenship, and 
influential networks within British and European institutional politics. As one of the 
youngest-ever elected local councillors in London at the age of 21, as well as a former 
talent scout for the Premier League football clubs Arsenal and Southampton, the 
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CEO2 started MLMS as a charity that could mobilise youth participation in politics. 
MLMS was explicitly founded on the advancement of specific diversities (youth, 
racial, and political) within politics, and during our ethnography we identified a 
consistent organisational logic that permeated its communicative practices and also 
seemed to rely on the engagement of existing ‘diverse’ personal and professional 
networks. 
MLMS positions itself as a youth-led charity aimed at bringing young people into 
politics by relating politics to their everyday experiences and concerns. MLMS refers 
to this focus on demystification (through direct encounters with political figures and 
events) as ‘rebranding’ politics, parlance evoking a neoliberal framing (Banet-Weiser, 
2012). Using ‘rebranding’ this way conveys a dual message: that politics has an optics 
problem wherein it is to blame for not surfacing tensions and stakes in a way that 
resonates with young people; and that young people are unable to make meaningful 
and relevant links between their lives and political activity in the UK. Use of market 
language of ‘rebranding’ invokes both capitalist and creative frames to present 
political perspectives as potential commodities for young people to relate to and 
become loyal to or aligned with.  
Aligning with Ahmed’s (2007, 2009) observations, MLMS relied heavily on the 
marketing of diversity – youth, racial, political – as one of its unique selling points to 
generate support for their work, to promote positive associations, and to also 
demonstrate success.  During observations and interviews, MLMS representatives 
framed young people and particularly young ethnic minority people as being outside 
of institutional political deliberative processes in the UK, and in need of better 
systemic representation in order to take forward concerns to policy and decision 
makers. MLMS’ conceptualisation of diversity therefore assumes that young people 
suffer from a number of systemic participation deficits which have to be overcome. 
For MLMS, young people are not adequately represented by politicians: there are too 
few who are young and hail from similar backgrounds to the diverse UK youth 
population; they are not given the proper tools or opportunities to assess how politics 
is relevant to their lives; and they have little recourse to having their views considered 
and acted upon by politicians. This construction of its mission links young and 
racially diverse people via of the label of marginalised populations. MLMS’ CEO 
often pointed out in public speeches a lack of young and/or minority politicians 
currently and historically in Parliament, citing it as a motivation for his entry into 
politics at a young age: 
I’ve always been a strong advocate of institutions reflecting the people it represents. 
The average age of councillors is 65 in the UK. Why don’t these chambers have 
people that represent the views of the young people?  
Interview with MLMS CEO, February 2017 
In terms of the types of young people it seeks to influence and involve in politics, we 
observed that MLMS conceptualised itself as a space especially for young people who 
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come from backgrounds historically underrepresented in institutional politics. The 
organisation’s focus on including young people from such backgrounds was easily 
observable at all of their events: young people from Black and Asian communities 
were often in the majority at such events.  This explicit targeting of young people 
appeared to be closely linked to the CEO’s own identity as a young Muslim of 
Turkish descent, and to his inner London social and professional networks of Black, 
Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) young people. Suggesting the significance of 
communities, and of having politicians from a range of racial and social backgrounds, 
many of these young people were personal friends recruited to either be trustees, 
occasional representatives, or attendees at his youth events. On several occasions in 
public speeches or presentations, in private conversations and in official research 
interviews, the CEO explicitly stated that MLMS exists to support youth voices not 
normally seen in formal politics – black and brown young people, young people from 
poor and marginalised communities, young people without expensive private 
education, and young people living in cities. During MLMS’ efforts to engage young 
people in research on their views about Brexit, he also prioritised the engagement of 
young ‘Leave’ supporters and young people from poor rural areas, whom he 
identified as primarily white, working class young people.  
Consistently throughout our research MLMS appeared to strive to implement 
activities that foregrounded the importance of the diversity of its participants. Indeed, 
the racial and ethnic diversity on display at MLMS events may partially explain the 
sustained nature of support given to the organisation by the European Commission, 
UK Parliament, and other political institutions. MLMS events usually felt different to 
many of the other youth citizenship programmes and events we attended as 
participant observers during the time of the ethnography. There was a level of visible 
racial diversity not usually seen in Parliament or in European Union buildings. Our 
field notes document ‘a satisfying, utopian feel’ to many of the public events. The 
combination of youth engagement and racial diversity performs a specific type of 
positive visibility for all involved. MLMS displays diversity, funds diversity, but 
encourages a very surface level engagement with politics. As Ahmed points out, 
everyone feels good. 
At these public events, in addition to the audiences, the panels selected by MLMS 
was notably diverse. There was a constant focus on diversity of appearance and 
perspective, as the CEO often took great effort to ensure that speakers actually looked 
like and reflected the experiences of the audiences for their events. At standalone 
events such as MLMS’ launch of its Brexit-related participation project at Hackney 
House in London on 12 April 2017, participants were invited into diverse worlds of 
Black British YouTube influencers, artists, poets and researchers, each of whom gave 
short talks (a white, conservative Brexiteer was also invited to speak at this event, and 
although the crowd was noticeably opposed to his comments, they were respectful 
and engaged). On the other hand, their series of Brexit cafés funded by the European 
Parliament Liaison Office in the UK from July to December 2017 featured an invited 
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MEP at each event (4 white women, 3 white men) who spoke to the lack of diversity 
within British political institutions. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, in observations of their public events for young people and in 
photographs of sessions we did not attend, it was evident that the geographical 
location played an important role in selecting the kinds of young people who 
participated. By the organisation’s own estimation (discussed in conversations with 
our researchers), sessions held outside of London tended to include a larger 
proportion of white young people than those held in London, although social class 
was less easy to estimate. As we did not observe any MLMS events taking place 
outside of London, nor were we privy to its youth recruitment strategies more widely, 
it is difficult to assess the ways in which MLMS attended to other aspects of diversity 
and inclusivity – for instance around sexuality, religion, and disability when recruiting 
participants in their events for youth.  
Certain public events demonstrated a dual focus on engaging young diverse youth 
while simultaneously marketing MLMS to a national audience. One such example 
was the Democracy Café event held in central London in May 2017, in which two 
nationally prominent female Black British public figures – the barrister and anti-
Brexit activist Gina Miller (GM), and the barrister and Guardian journalist Afua 
Hirsch (AH) – were invited speakers, along with several local politicians from each of 
the main parties (Labour, Tory, and Liberal Democrats). As an observer it was 
difficult not to be overwhelmed by the sheer number of media outlets capturing the 
event: 
The general impression is that this event is too media saturated. Every table 
discussion is being captured by either a video or an audio recording, some tables have 
multiple recording device people doing their thing on the outskirts of the table. Some 
of the participants are adjusting themselves every so often to the big cameras getting 
in people’s faces. At the same time virtually every MLMS staff member is also 
capturing the event on their phones and iPads. It is interesting to see AH and GM as 
well as the Labour and Tory politicians actually sitting with young people and having 
a conversation, but as they’re all flanked by media or devices of some sort, the flow 
of the discussion feels a little forced.  
Field notes, May 2017 
 
At least five news stations were present at the event, including BBC, London Live, 
and even a German radio station. The event appeared to show MLMS working 
towards two clear goals: to deliver a meaningful event for young people, and to 
generate visibility for the organisation and its work. There was considerable substance 
to the roundtable discussions between young people and the politicians, journalists 
and activists that were present. There were also well-rehearsed political speeches by 
the celebrities present, demonstrating the celebrity clout of the organisers. And the 
number of those documenting the event was so high relative to the number of youth 
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participants, that the event from beginning to end resembled a fevered marketing 
exercise. This speaks to how focused MLMS was on attracting national visibility to 
their cause, by marketing their youth and diversity work as news story ‘products’ 
being sold for national and European audiences. 
INSERT FIGURE 5.1 (Banaji-Mejias Figure 5.1 IMG_8157) 
Analysis of our observations and interviews foregrounds that the young people who 
participate in MLMS events and follow its social media activities are intended to be 
recipients of a positive message of youth engagement. They are encouraged to see in 
the CEO an example of BAME youth citizenship success – in fact of empowerment – 
that can be emulated; and in light of this role model, to re-conceptualise politics and 
its relation to their lives as young people. Encouraging this emulation, MLMS’ CEO 
often brought young black and brown people from his social circles into the 
organisation as volunteers, staff, or emissaries. In one example, a long-time friend of 
the CEO was recruited to participate in a focus group session when the session was 
low on numbers, and also called in last minute to represent MLMS at an event of a 
fellow British youth organisation that the CEO could not attend. He was described to 
our researchers as a ‘trustee’ but it was also clear that the relationship was more 
friendly and informal which allowed for last minute favours. In conversation with one 
of our researchers, MLMS’ CEO framed this as an opportunity for his friend to get 
more involved, in a way that celebrated the potential positive outcomes of pushing his 
friend into youth citizenship action. It also suggested that for the CEO, looping in 
youthful friends who could freely donate their time to help out their politician-youth 
activist friend was a well-tested strategy for extending the reach and visibility of his 
MLMS brand within the world of institutionalised youth politics. This engagement of 
a personal circle of friends and supporters may potentially limit the pursuit of 
diversity and inclusivity goals to those contained within self-selected networks. 
 
Diversity in organisational communications 
When it comes to public-facing communications, MLMS relied primarily on Twitter, 
Facebook and Instagram to publicise their projects and events. Their visual 
representations were very diverse, more often than not featuring pictures of black and 
brown young people. There are also interesting choices made in MLMS’ public 
communication that indicate a close attention to the details of performing diversity. 
For example, while seemingly inconsequential in isolation, a close analysis of 
MLMS’ Twitter feed from February 2017 to January 2018 showed a remarkably 
consistent usage of emojis with different skin tones. Most often this was manifested in 
a white ‘fist bump’ emoji next to a black ‘fist bump’ emoji, but there were also usages 
of a ‘pointed finger’ emoji in both black and white skin tones. This subtle but clear 
decision to duplicate an emoji with two different ‘races’ performs the work of 
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signifying racial solidarity, which would appear consistent with both their event and 
participant profiles. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 5.2 HERE (Banaji-Mejias Figure 5.2.png) 
 
Although MLMS consistently updated their social media feeds with new posts, their 
social media strategy did not appear to be focused on expanding their social media 
network. They added roughly 900 followers between 28 March 2017 (when they had 
5,218) and 12 January 2018 (6,118). Yet at every event our researchers attended, the 
imperative to document goings-on for social media sharing was paramount. The CEO 
or an MLMS staff member would take pictures, and post either staff selfies, pictures 
of VIP attendees, or pictures of MLMS or other organisational branding present at the 
event, and instantly upload to social media (in particular, banner placement for the 
portable MLMS banners was always an important task during each event in order to 
achieve the best visibility for the brand). However, there was little evidence that 
MLMS actively sought to recruit or engage more young people via social media 
throughout 2017. What was in full evidence, however, was a frequent exhortation to 
participants in its public events – who were very often themselves either young people 
of colour, or linked into the work of MLMS via the CEO’s personal and professional 
connections – to use social media to promote the particular MLMS event or initiative 
taking place. In this way, it was possible to observe in real time the formulation of 
participatory filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011) in the online world, specifically in relation 
to how MLMS encouraged the use of social media to ‘tell your friends’ about getting 
involved in politics. Crucially, the aim of such calls to connective action (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2012) was not explicitly about building new audiences and constituencies 
for the MLMS movement; rather, it was about bringing in the networks of existing 
participants into the MLMS movement. 
In addition to social media MLMS were particularly careful to document how often 
their organisation was mentioned or featured in mainstream and legacy media. MLMS 
shared with our researchers an internal document entitled ‘2017 MLMS Mentions’ 
referring to instances when the organisation was featured or mention in a media or 
news item. The document itself, which aggregates a total of 54 mentions for the year, 
is telling in terms of the value placed by the organisation on media visibility (and on 
sharing the record of that visibility as a way to generate additional support). 
Reviewing these media mentions reveals an occasionally savvy use of the media to 
generate visibility for the organisation. For example, an Evening Standard article 
about getting young people to vote3 that featured actor/activist Emma Watson, cited 
MLMS’s work, quoted one of its Asian female staff members encouraging all young 
people to vote regardless of political preference, and offered impact statistics about 
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MLMS’ work. In the context of the article it reads as a sort of glowing 
recommendation or advertisement.  
Similarly, in internal communications regarding fundraising, MLMS recognised that 
their mission to advance diversity in institutional politics represented a valuable 
commodity for attracting potential supporters and funders. In a conversation about 
applying for funding, the CEO felt that in drafting a proposal ’our main highlight 
needs to be that the most marginalised through the organisations we are working with 
will have their voices heard through a structured engagement platform,’, referring to 
the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for a Better Brexit for Young People that 
MLMS had set up, and through which a number of its highest profile research and 
public engagement projects were being implemented.  The CEO also added that their 
proposal should emphasise “the diversity of views in the APPG,” which refers to the 
careful work of bringing in youth participants who were both pro- and anti-Brexit. 
This approach – to leverage their identity as a racially diverse, multi-cultural youth 
charity for support – is sensible and pragmatic for a grassroots youth organisation 
with no sustained funding, run by two paid employees and a handful of interns, 
volunteers, and part time staffers. The act of selling a diversity product in order to 
influence politics in the direction of institutional equality reveals again how neoliberal 
values appropriate and compromise justice struggles (Moyn, 2014). 
 
Other aspects of ‘diversity’ 
There seemed to be little consideration of gender in the conceptualisation of diversity 
at MLMS; nor was there any explicit acknowledgement, on the part of the 
organisation, about the importance of gender diversity and inclusivity. It is, therefore, 
difficult to draw conclusions regarding an organisational commitment to gender 
equality except by noting an absence of engagement with gender politics as part of 
their youth active citizenship work or as part of their understanding of the meaning of 
diversity. In its own organisational representation, all of MLMS’ paid part time staff 
apart from the CEO were young women. Several young men acted as volunteers or 
interns during our study, but none were hired as paid staff. During our study at 
various stages we interacted with six young women who worked for MLMS either 
part or full time; three were White British, one was Black British and two were from 
Asian British backgrounds. At its public events, and with regard to speakers, there 
was usually a relatively even level of gender representation. However, the collected 
data strongly suggest that MLMS’ definition of diversity was most often in reference 
only to racial and ethnic diversity of young people, or to young people as diversifying 
the age profile of active citizens.  Furthermore, the gender hierarchy between the male 
CEO and his female staff members was often  highly visible during our observations 
of private and public events. 
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6.2 Momentum: Diversity as implicit, contingent and rhetorical  
In contrast to MLMS, Momentum’s focus on diversity was considerably less explicit 
or visible. We found that Momentum’s identity was implicitly diverse in terms of age 
profile. We also observed how the national office and its subsequent public 
communications team embodied a youthful identity and practices contingent on 
young people occupying important leadership roles within the national structure. 
Overall, apart from the diversity of ages within the organisation and the number of 
young women involved at different levels, our study found that Momentum’s 
conception of, commitment to, and practices around racial and class diversity and 
inclusion were largely rhetorical.  
As a cross-generational grassroots campaign group which at times verged on being a 
social movement, Momentum’s conceptualisation of young people was accessible 
through participant and non-participant observations but never explicitly stated. 
During our fieldwork, the idea of ‘youth’ as constitutive of Momentum’s identity was 
apparent particularly through the ways in which young people under the age of 30 
worked within, were represented by, and became interested in the work of the 
organisation and of the organised, party-linked socialist politics it represents; and in 
terms of how the organisation’s campaigning and activism reflected and attracted 
young volunteers and paid staff. Staff at Momentum showed a keen understanding of 
how ‘young people’ as a category are perceived and stereotyped both within and 
outside of the organisation. In particular, there was a clear recognition of the major 
gap between the mainstream media portrayals of Momentum’s ‘youthfulness’ – as a 
violent youth movement of extreme left militants4 – and the perception within the 
organisation of a dedicated, politically compassionate, and professional group of 
youth activists working for egalitarian social change through institutional political 
structures. There was also a sense within Momentum that it had become associated 
positively with at least a segment of a generation of young people eager for a change 
to the status quo of British austerity politics. Its social media team played an 
important role in projecting this youthful identity while also bringing in further youth 
supporters. Led by young people who had grown up using digital media, smart phones 
and apps, and also adult professionals in filmmaking, its sharp understanding of 
effective social media video dissemination and telephone messaging for virality 
played a critical role in generating support for the Labour party during the 2017 
general election campaign.  
One leading staffer who was 29 when he joined Momentum shared his view that the 
appeal of youthfulness was important but also unrepresentative of the membership 
overall: 
We do try to give that appearance of being young, youthful and vibrant and stuff like 
that. But it’s also just a media narrative. Majority of Momentum members aren’t 
young. The majority of Momentum’s active members, people who actually get out, 
campaign, do stuff, are older.  
 17 
Munir, 31 
The response of this staffer and others recognised that the perception – or branding – 
of youthfulness was an important part of the group’s identity. This was usually 
acknowledged in a visible way in two particularly important areas – within the 
makeup of the national office’s staff (where young people occupied central roles), and 
as part of their organisational activism strategy, which included minimal joining fees 
ostensibly aimed at attracting young people with lower incomes. Despite the appeal to 
youth, the local chapter structure of Momentum and its linkages with traditional 
Labour party meant that most active members were locals over the age of 30.  
Our ethnography revealed an important connection between the age profile of the 
national office staff and the subsequent emphasis on using social and online media 
and other youth oriented activist and media approaches to generate support for Jeremy 
Corbyn and Labour during the 2017 general election as an aspect of Momentum’s 
national campaign strategy. In particular, practices of instant-response social media 
content creation for virality, and of framing issues in ways that resonated with young 
people, were used with what we consider to be success. One staff member shared: 
[We] have ultra-young staff teams as you can see. Which then like played back into 
the movement through like the content put out... the way we frame things and the 
kind of tools that we design.  
Jim, 25 
 
Young people working at Momentum’s national office very often occupied positions 
of significant authority across critical areas of work, including communications and 
public relations with mainstream national news organisations, leadership of creative 
and digital media campaigns, online-to-offline organising of canvassing and get-out-
the-vote efforts, activist trainings, and event planning and management. Because the 
national office coordinated national strategy and action, Momentum’s seemingly 
ceaseless creation of digital content – informational, satirical or motivational videos 
responding to breaking news about Labour or Theresa May, quickly turned around 
and sent either to members or posted to social media to generate hits or keep 
followers informed –  combined with the presence of young people in the national 
office at high levels of responsibility almost always ensured that a young person 
would be the ‘face’ of Momentum in much of its public-facing media content. 
Excerpts from our field notes reveal a familiar occurrence: 
Earlier this afternoon I was upstairs on the roof doing an interview with Munir. 
Brenda was also there being recorded by one of the camera guys rattling off another 
inspirational message to the Momentum supporters to be quickly turned around and 
sent out either on the social media channels or in a supporter email. I asked her, ‘Is 
this all you do here, shoot promotional videos?’ A little while later in the office I 
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heard Ernie and Tino joking about Brenda being ‘the young face of Momentum.’ 
Brenda was enjoying the debate and smiling.  
Field Notes, Momentum National Office, Nov 2017, Whitechapel 
In interviews with both younger and older adult staff at Momentum, some mentioned 
how the current generation of youth political grievances could be directly – and 
unfavourably – compared to the entitlements and affordances that were granted to 
older generations of British citizens during their youth. One of Momentum’s adult 
founders succinctly summarised the dilemma of youth discontent with austerity 
Britain: 
I didn't have [university] fees to pay. I got a grant. I could sign on and collect [a 
welfare payment], and if I didn't get a job in the holiday periods I could sign on and I 
didn't have to work at university. Whereas now people have to work all the way 
through university and may leave with debt the size of a bloody mortgage and they 
can't get any housing. [It’s] generational inequality.  
Jake, 60 
 
A younger staffer echoed these thoughts on generational inequality, attributing the 
rise of Corbyn’s popularity directly to his appeal in terms of young people’s desires 
for a different kind of society and to young people’s discontent with the current 
systemic inequality: 
 
Corbyn-ism was in a large sense or in a certain sense a youth movement because 
young people are getting fucked and have been now for ages and obviously they 
wouldn’t turn up to vote so obviously no one cared instead of like putting forward 
policies that actually affected them. But then that spawned and influenced 
organisations such as Momentum. 
Jim, 25 
 
By framing their political agenda in terms of differential experiences of government 
benefits between older and younger generations (and subsequent quality of life 
issues), Momentum adopted a logic of youth rights. When paired with the contingent 
affordances of having young people in key communications roles at the national level, 
this generated powerful political communication narratives for audiences that 
implicitly articulated Momentum as a youth-focused political movement. 
By privileging the voice and rights of youth – albeit a specific subset who did not 
necessarily reflect the diverse range of British youth – as part of their campaign work, 
Momentum demonstrated a commitment to the promotion of structural change as it 
related to diversifying the participation of and social welfare for young citizens: 
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addressing generational inequality, as Jake put it. However, while this did show a 
commitment to advancing equality through an agenda that recognised the diversity 
represented by youth, it was less vocal regarding racial or gender diversity. 
Momentum occupied a much more rhetorical position in relation to practices of racial 
diversity. While our respondents frequently spoke of the importance of diversity, 
there was little evidence of its prioritisation. The young people working at Momentum 
during our fieldwork were mostly white, and many were university educated (some 
were involved in the UK Uncut movement beginning in 2010-2011 around anti-
austerity action). Many working-class young people with similar feelings of 
scepticism about government policy and hopes for a different government would not 
have had the financial means to survive while volunteering their time at Momentum. 
One of the older staffers we spoke with referred to some of the young people working 
at the national office as ‘middle class.’ She made the point that young people who 
can’t afford not to work because their families and they themselves are dependent on 
those wages (even low ones) are unable to be involved in the same way as most of the 
Momentum volunteers. Her recognition of the connections between a certain level of 
economic privilege and political engagement were incisive and self-aware. Belonging 
to a particular social class does not denigrate the choices and commitment to an 
alternative politics which led the young momentum volunteers we worked with to 
donate time for which there were many competing demands; but it might explain the 
difficulty that the organisation faced in its model of wanting to attract and yet being 
unable to sustain the participation of a wide class spectrum of youth. 
Another key staff member, one of just three national officers (out of approximately 
25) who was not white, affirmed the central issue underpinning the lack of class, 
ethnic and racial diversity, and suggested that this applied even to paid staff: 
Diversity [at Momentum] is terrible, it’s really bad. In terms of our staff team and 
volunteer team, there’s definitely an economic issue. In that we pay shit. So, you have 
to be a person in an economic situation that allows you to get paid crap money to do 
incredibly time-consuming work. So that a) takes out people with care duties, people 
with family duties. So, majority of people are young, single or in a relationship that 
hasn’t reached into that point yet. And then on top of that, so much of the left is based 
on people you know, people who get involved – it’s been dominated by white middle 
class people for so long. And that hasn’t been addressed. So, whereas Momentum as 
an organisation has that problem, we’re in the fortunate position [that this is] 
recognised.  
Munir, 31 
Munir contrasted what he perceived as having been a severe and callous lack of 
attention and care for or about BAME citizens on the part of the Labour Party in the 
past two decades, to his perception that Momentum recognises its own lack of racial 
and class diversity as a problem. He also drew an important connection between class, 
race and youth to suggest why so many of the staffers were both white and young. 
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A white female paid staff member commented on diversity from the perspectives of 
gender and race: 
I do see [diversity] happening but I do I think it could happen more. It could be more 
encouraging towards a different range of people. It's always difficult to get for 
example women involved because it's such already like historically it's been a male 
environment. And that's the same with politics. It's been like a male, a white male 
environment and it is always difficult to change that but Momentum probably could 
be doing more.  
Roberta, 22 
This staff member’s response addressed a gender gap that existed in the national 
office staff, although there are many women in senior positions within Momentum. 
Like Munir and Jim’s responses, Roberta’s comments revealed a wider awareness 
within Momentum that their movement was not successfully addressing the issues of 
diversity and inclusion. The question that prompted the above response asked Roberta 
to comment on ‘diversity’ and did not define what was meant by the word; in her 
reply she spoke about diversity mainly in terms of gender diversity, albeit with an 
acknowledgment of the intersection with race in the phrase ‘male, white 
environment’. This contrasts with the MLMS CEO’s framing of diversity as about 
race, youth, and political persuasion, and suggests that the phrase ‘diversity’ means 
different things to different people within these youth citizenship organisations. This 
is one area in which we as researchers and participant observers with a shared interest 
in the social justice goals of the organisation had to be reflexive in acknowledging 
that, at the height of a political campaign, asking busy and over-worked informants to 
consider why and in what ways their ‘diversity work’ was falling short was not an 
ethical line of enquiry or an effective intervention.   
 
Campaign group communications 
When examining Momentum’s voluminous online and social media public 
communications, as well as its official public documents, supporter emails, and other 
public materials, the contrast between its visual depictions of diversity and that of 
MLMS is notable. We analysed images from Momentum’s Twitter activity from 1 
April – 31 December 2017, which included the 2017 general election campaign, to get 
a sense of the types of people most likely to be visually featured on the timeline. The 
three individuals most likely to be depicted were Jeremy Corbyn, Theresa May, and 
the Guardian journalist Owen Jones (a vocal Momentum supporter and something of 
a mainstream media spokesperson through his columns and public speaking 
engagement). There was very little engagement of racial, gender or even youth 
diversity. There were, however, two explicit posts in late 2017 that directly addressed 
diversity (see below). Interestingly, during the same period, while MLMS’ Twitter 
timeline featured far more people of colour in photographs, videos and 
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advertisements, there were no explicit posts such as those from Momentum that 
directly addressed racial diversity as an issue MLMS worked on.   
INSERT FIGURE 5.3 HERE TWO PICTURES SIDE-BY-SIDE 
Banaji-Mejias Figure 5.3 LEFT SIDE IMAGE.png 
Banaji-Mejias Figure 5.3 RIGHT SIDE IMAGE.png 
 
Beyond these examples and a select few others (including two where Jeremy Corbyn 
was photographed with Black British celebrities including Stormzy), Momentum’s 
online campaign practices did not include many appeals to diversity as a part of its 
campaigning or political communications. By virtue of its extremely close 
connections to the Labour party and to Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, the audience 
for its communications seem to be the voting public who are either supporters of 
Labour, the Tories, Liberal Democrats or other miscellaneous parties on the Right and 
the Left – in other words, individuals targeted in terms of their potential to switch 
political affiliations. This is of course normal political campaign behaviour, but it 
does indicate that the notion of ‘diversity’ – that is, building a coalition of citizens 
committed to class, racial, gender, body, and sexual inclusivity, as an operating 
principle of politics – was not central to Momentum’s communication strategy.  
Both Momentum’s public facing communications and our ethnographic observations 
and interviews make apparent a strong commitment to economic and social justice for 
all residents of the United Kingdom. The group fielded videos of supporters or local 
politicians who speak about needing political change in order for people to be able to 
afford to live decent and dignified lives in a time of austerity, or to build tolerance 
amongst communities and challenge xenophobic views. The themes of economic 
justice and social inequality reflected a progressive left view of politics, and also 
implicitly framed a political message of class diversity that could be attained via 
systemic changes promised by Corbyn and Labour. Momentum’s politics clearly 
indicate a strong solidarity with an agenda to increase diversity, although it does not 
appear to occupy a significant pillar of its work.  
 
Conclusion  
Across MLMS and Momentum, conceptions of diversity were most similar when 
casting youth as the demographic group in need of greater inclusion in British 
politics. Yet each case presents an interesting example of how diversity becomes 
reified for young people engaging in civic or political projects.  
MLMS embodies racial and ethnic diversity through their participant engagement 
practices (who shows up, how they get them there), personal (friends) and 
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professional networks (e.g. the youth charity Bite the Ballot, who also focus on youth 
and minority equality in politics), cultural choices (what images are depicted on social 
media), and mission and values rhetoric. Diversity for MLMS also takes on neoliberal 
qualities through their use of the ‘feel good’ factor of getting young diverse citizens to 
debate politics (sometimes literally as a performance for the cameras, as witnessed at 
the Gina Miller event) to generate media attention and financial support from 
institutional political actors. MLMS appear to have a strong focus on marketing their 
cause in order to sustain and grow their work. Diversity is therefore simultaneously 
rhetorical (it is the discourse of their organisation), instrumental (it generates profit), 
and superficial (it masks structural issues). Momentum, on the other hand, embodies 
racial diversity primarily as it is constructed in the Labour party’s political platform, 
as a pillar of an otherwise broader political movement for economic and social justice. 
They represent a very different case to MLMS, and while there were some clear 
examples of how diversity is a part of their work, it was rather peripheral to their 
overall activities.  
Our study found that to a large extent MLMS’ work aligns with Ahmed’s (2007, 
2009) argument about the way in which neoliberalism inflects – or infects – diversity 
discourses and practices. With the second case, Momentum’s relative non-
engagement with diversity as an aspect of their political campaigning activities does 
not offer any indication that, when framing or organising diversity work, they would 
employ market logic to ‘sell’ diversity as a part of their campaign group brand.  
Overall, both groups express deep commitments to challenging inequalities and to the 
promise of progressive politics to enact structural change, and diversity work 
represents an aspect of that mission. Our findings suggest that there are areas where 
Momentum could further embrace and foreground diversity as part of a broader 
economic and social justice platform. Our study also suggests that, despite embodying 
diversity on a number of levels and offering real and meaningful opportunities for 
young people of colour to experience institutional politics, MLMS’ diversity work 
could go even farther by focusing on the politics of structural change for racial as well 
as youth equality – for example, MLMS could explicitly champion structural change 
for increased diversity into their policy and event work, and be more explicit about 
how diversity drives their mission. But what is visible instead is the primacy of youth 
diversity to their mission; whereas Momentum campaigned around the Labour party 
manifesto, which included but did not focus explicitly on racial diversity.  This 
engaging of only one type diversity only uses one plank of a powerful multi-plank 
equality platform. 
Because both groups are political in nature there is little evidence of a depoliticisation 
of race in their conceptualisation and enactment of diversity – in fact the opposite is 
on view. It is clear that both groups recognised that race and diversity are 
fundamentally political issues, and that it is not possible to discuss diversity without 
discussing racism. Thus, our study suggests that in cases where politics underpins the 
work of youth citizenship groups or movements, as with MLMS and Momentum, 
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there is potentially less risk of diversity becoming a ‘technology for not hearing’ 
(Ahmed, 2009, p. 47). 
Importantly, both organisations’ offline (collective) and online (connective) spaces 
for youth citizenship appeared to embody a kind of participatory ‘filter bubble’ 
(Pariser, 2011) by speaking within their narrowly defined, self-selecting audiences 
rather than across or reaching out to diverse groups of young people and political 
audiences. Our ethnography suggests that patterns of organisational diversity (e.g. 
with Momentum, its mostly white staff, and with MLMS, its BAME leadership and 
female staff) can operate as an offline ‘filter bubble’. Furthermore, we argue that both 
offline and online networks reproduce the same narrow networks that do not match 
rhetoric of widening participatory diversity with concomitant practices (in the case of 
MLMS, even when ‘diversity’ becomes a rallying cry for the organisation’s work). 
Our study cannot confirm previous findings of racial homophily in youth voluntary 
associations (Hampton & Duncan, 2011) as it did not directly ask questions about 
racial identity formation in youth organisational settings. However our identification 
of potentially racialised participatory bubbles in each of our cases provides further 
indication that social capital in civic initiatives is racially inflected. Furthermore, it 
suggests that without an explicit focus on the substance of anti-racism, class and 
gender equality (irrespective of the fundamentally political nature of each group’s 
engagement of diversity) racial and class homophily may be a potential de facto 
outcome, even for non-white groups such as those affiliated with MLMS, despite the 
fundamentally integrative nature of bringing people of colour into a mostly white 
institutional political space or set of spaces. It is therefore possible to infer, in line 
with the findings of Checkoway (2009), that in the cases of both MLMS and 
Momentum, explicit and direct education and action around racial, ethnic, gender, 
class, disability and other forms of marginalised or historically underrepresented 
identities might offer more substantive and transformative opportunities to promote 
equity and solidarity in a youth citizenship context.  
 
Notes 
1 For example, see UpRising UK’s mission to “break the cycle of unrepresentative 
power in the UK, by developing new, community-minded and socially-conscious 
leaders; so that our future decision-makers truly represent our diverse communities” 
(https://www.uprising.org.uk/about-us). Another example is the British Youth 
Council, which lists ‘inclusive’ as one of its core values and insist that “we ensure 
that all our activities our inclusive, recognising the needs of young people across 
different communities, and bring young people and partners together to learn from 
each other” (https://www.byc.org.uk/about-us/our-vision-mission-and-values). 
2 MLMS agreed to have its name made public for this study, but the CEO’s name is 
withheld as all individual respondents are anonymised.  
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3 https://www.standard.co.uk/lifestyle/esmagazine/general-election-2017-why-
millennials-votes-will-matter-a3539646.html. Retrieved 1 March 2019. 
4 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/labour/12156177/momentum-activists-
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